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Abstract
This paper investigates whether transactions where the buyer (or the seller)
always moves …rst, and the seller (or the buyer) always moves second in the ex-
change gives higher payo¤s than exchanges in which it is randomly determined
who moves …rst. We examine the e¤ect of two treatment variables: Partners versus
Strangers and …xed versus changing positions. We …nd that both with …xed and
with changing positions, second movers take advantage of their position by exploit-
ing the …rst mover by “not delivering” the demanded good. However, with …xed
positions exploitation occurs signi…cantly less while reciprocal exchanges happen
more often. In spite of this, it turns out that with …xed positions payo¤s are very
unevenly distributed. Unequal payo¤ distributions occur both under Partners and
Strangers, but they appear to be more extreme among Strangers.
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1 Introduction
If in the US a consumption good is purchased on delivery, or a hotel reservation is made,
the customer has to give guarantees that (s)he is able to a¤ord the expenses by giving
a credit card number, or by simply paying in advance. In European countries, like the
Netherlands, the customer will usually pay after delivery without him/her being asked
for evidence of his/her …nancial standing before delivery. In labor relations an employer,
in trying to …ll a vacancy, usually o¤ers a new worker a wage before the actual work e¤ort
of the worker is known. If the employer-worker relationship turns out to be more or less
permanent, the employer can react to the worker’s e¤orts by o¤ering wage increases.
The transactions in these examples have in common that they are of a sequential
nature. That is, after ordering a good some time elapses before consumption can take
place or, in the case of the labor-market example, before the e¤ort of the worker can be
established. One of the two market parties involved moves …rst after which the other
party moves. As a consequence, the …rst mover has to put con…dence in the second
mover that he will respond to her …rst move in a reciprocal way. For instance, if a good
or service has been paid for by the buyer, it is uncertain whether the supplier will actually
deliver the good or service demanded or whether the quality of the good or service is
as expected. Or, the other way round, if a supplier has delivered …rst, she has to await
whether payment will follow suit. In game-theoretic terms we could say that in these
exchanges there is priority in time and priority in information.
It might be added here that in the real world con…dence in the realization of a trans-
action can be engendered by the existence of some warranty institution. Holiday trips
are a case in point: potential demanders can only infer from a brochure the quality of
the o¤ered accommodation and its surroundings. For that reason quite often these trips
are sold alongside with a claim for the buyer for a refund if the quality of the lodging or
the venue does not …t the description of the brochure. For the kind of transactions that
we have in mind, however, such a warranty does not exist and if it did, it would not be
e¤ective as for the consumer the (money and time) costs of claiming a refund surpasses
the expected reimbursement. By the same token, suppliers as …xed …rst movers, as is
the case e.g. with mail-order houses, sometimes do not legally enforce payments from
defaulting customers, as the transaction costs involved are larger than the amount of
money to be claimed.
It has been observed in a variety of (experimental) settings that subjects are inclined
to behave reciprocally by rewarding nice acts and punishing unkind behavior (e.g. Fehr,
Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1996), Camerer and Thaler (1995); see Fehr and Gächter
(2000) for a survey). The employment relationship is a case in point. Usually an employer
…rst commits herself to paying a certain wage to a worker, after which the worker chooses
an e¤ort level. For the worker there is an incentive to shirk, which for the employer,
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who should anticipate this behavior, implies that she will commit herself to paying the
reservation wage only. Experimental evidence shows, however, that employers make quite
generous o¤ers, while workers are on average willing to put forward extra e¤ort above
what is implied by purely pecuniary considerations (e.g. Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl
(1993)), even under conditions with a rather high stake level or in very competitive double
auction markets (for a survey, see Fehr and Gächter (2000) and the references therein).
In the labor market, the demand side (the …rm) usually moves before the supply side
(the worker) by o¤ering a wage contract without exact knowledge of the e¤ort to be
provided by the worker. On the US consumer market the demand side usually has to
move …rst (e.g. by producing a credit card number), while on the European consumer
market the supply side has to move …rst (by delivering the demanded goods or services).
Thus, the order of the moves is …xed: in some markets the buyer will always have to move
…rst, and in other markets the supply side is assigned to be the …rst moving party. The
question presents itself whether such role assignments have some economic justi…cation.
Will it help to improve exchange and to raise e¢ciency if demand and supply have a …xed
role in concluding a transaction, i.e. by always having the same side of the market moving
…rst, and the same side of the market moving second? Or, will it ameliorate exchange
if the role assignment is subject to change, i.e. sometimes one side of the market has to
move …rst, and sometimes the other side of the market has to move …rst?
A related question is whether the impact of the role assignment depends upon the
permanency of the relationship. Typically, customers will stay in a certain hotel only
once in their life, but the relationship between an employer and an employee has a
more enduring character, and a changing role may then be more conducive to successful
exchange than a …xed role.
In this paper we try to answer the questions alluded to above by experimental data.
It is not the purpose of the paper to explain which side of the market will get the …rst- or
second-mover position in exchange. Our experiments do not allow for the identi…cation of
the “supply side” or the “demand side” of the market. We use an experimental repeated
bilateral exchange game where both sides of the exchange are in a symmetrical position in
that they can o¤er their counterpart a certain part of their endowment. The (sequential)
exchange game allows for reciprocal exchange. The unique Nash equilibrium involves no
exchange. We relate the characteristics of exchange to two treatment variables. The …rst
one is the so-called Partners/Strangers treatment, which has often been found to be a
determining variable for the (non)emergence of voluntary cooperation.1 In the Partners
1The Partners and Strangers treatments were introduced by Andreoni (1988) in a public good exper-
iment to distinguish between simple learning and strategies. Surprisingly, he found that Strangers con-
tribute more to the public good than Partners do. Replications of this study found, however, that Part-
ners contribute more (Croson (1996)) or that there is no signi…cant di¤erence (Weimann (1994)). The
general concencus seems to be that in most situations Partners are more inclined to behave cooperatively.
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treatment, players play the game repeatedly against the same opponent. In terms of our
examples above, labor relations can typically be named as the real-world counterpart
of this treatment. In the Strangers treatment, players are randomly rematched after
each round: players meet the same opponent occasionally with random probability, but
typically the next opponent will be a di¤erent one than the current one. Hotel stays are
an example of this treatment. It can be argued that cooperation is likely to be facilitated
when repeated interaction takes place with the same opponents (Partners) rather then
with varying opponents (Strangers) (see e.g. Van der Heijden et al. (2000)).
Taking this conjecture for granted we investigate whether the position of the players
has an independent e¤ect on the emergence of cooperation. To that end we introduce
the …xed/changing position as a second treatment variable. Under …xed positions one
player is the …rst mover during all repeated plays (rounds), whereas the other player is
always the second mover. Under changing positions, it is randomly determined in each
round who is the …rst and who is the second mover. We investigate whether or not …xed
positions are conducive to obtaining higher payo¤s and/or more reciprocal exchanges.
In the next section we brie‡y introduce our experimental game and procedure. The
third section presents our results. We …nd that both in the …xed and the changing
treatments second movers take advantage of their position by exploiting the …rst mover
by “not delivering” the demanded good. Yet, in the …xed treatments second movers are
signi…cantly less engaged in exploiting their strategic advantage. This renders the guess
justi…ed that …xed positions are more conducive to generating reciprocal exchange than
changing positions. On the other hand, as with changing positions an exploited subject
can become an “exploiter” when she happens to get into the second-mover position,
the average …rst mover in a …xed treatment is (signi…cantly) worse o¤ than the average
individual with changing positions. In the Partners treatment with …xed positions even
the average second mover is not better o¤ than the average individual with changing
positions. As a result, for Partners it will unambiguously increase the average payo¤ if
exchange takes place under changing positions. Among Strangers, the result will not be
that clear-cut. Converting exchange with …xed positions into exchange with changing
positions will on average bene…t the …rst mover signi…cantly, but the second mover will
on average signi…cantly lose from such a conversion. Section 4 contains a summary and
a concluding discussion.
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2 Game and experimental procedure
2.1 The game
The experiment is based on a sequential exchange game (Van der Heijden et al. (1998)).
In this game, the payo¤-function P is given by
P (Ti; Tj) = (9¡ Ti)(1 + Tj) (1)
where Ti (Tj) is a transfer from player i (j) to player j (i), i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j.
The exchange game can be given the following interpretation: In period 1, player 1
has an endowment of 9, which she can use to “buy” a good, i.e. by “paying” an amount
T1 to player 2 (0 · T1 · 7). In the second period player 1 has an endowment of 1. In this
period, player 2 can use his endowment of 9 to “deliver” the good by giving T2 to player 1
(0 · T2 · 7).2 Player 2 knows the size of T1 before he has to decide on T2. Endowments,
payment T1 and delivery T2 together determine the …nal asset levels of the two players
in the two periods. In the period in which player i pays or delivers Ti, his …nal assets
are 9¡ Ti. In the period in which player i receives Tj as a payment or a delivery, player
i’s …nal assets are 1 + Tj. The payo¤s to player i are de…ned as the product of the …nal
assets levels in the two periods, as shown in (1).
We employ a 2£2 factorial design, with treatment variables matching structure (Part-
ners versus Strangers) and position (…xed versus changing positions). Under Partners,
subjects are matched with the same opponent for all rounds to be played, whereas under
Strangers, subjects are randomly rematched at the beginning of each round. In the …xed
treatment, subjects are assigned to be player 1 or player 2 for all rounds to be played,
while in the changing treatment, it is randomly decided at the beginning of each round
whether a subject is player 1 or player 2 in that round.
2.2 The experimental procedure
In total 16 sessions of the sequential exchange game were run in Tilburg, the Netherlands,
in March 1995 and in April 1996.3 All sessions were run with eight subjects, which gives a
2Both buyer-seller examples mentioned in the introduction are covered by this design. One inter-
pretation of the game is that in the …rst period player 1 pays a certain amount and that in the second
period player 2 delivers the good with a certain value/quality (the US case). Alternatively, in the …rst
period player 1 delivers the good and in the second period player 2 pays for the good (the European
case). In both situations it can occur that player 1 receives less (or more) than expected or hoped for.
I.e. in the …rst situation, player 2 can deliver a good with a lower (or higher) value/quality and in the
second situation, player 2 can pay less (or more) than the value of the good. To keep the exposition
clear, we use the …rst interpretation (the US case) in the remainder of this paper. In addition, for sake
of convenience, we refer to T as the transfer.
3The experiments presented here are part of a research project investigating the relationship between
inter- and intragenerational gift exchanges.
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total of 128 participants. A session typically lasted for about an hour. The subjects were
undergraduate and graduate students from Tilburg University. They came from various
disciplines like law and psychology, but the majority studied economics or business.4
Participants were mainly recruited by an announcement in the University Bulletin and
by posters. None of the participants had previous experience from any related experiment
and none of them participated more than once.
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly seated behind computer terminals, which were
separated by partitions. Instructions, reproduced in the Appendix to this paper, were
distributed and read aloud by the experimenter. After that, subjects got several minutes
to study the instructions more carefully and to ask questions. Then one practice round
was played.
After the practice round, the eight subjects played 15 repetitions of the exchange
game. At the start of the session, four couples were formed in the Partner treatments.
These persons remained paired during the remaining part of the experiment. In the
…xed treatment, the role was also determined at the start, whereas in the changing
treatment, this role was randomly assigned at the beginning of each round. In the
Strangers treatments, subjects were randomly rematched each round. Here, the role was
also assigned each round again in the changing treatment, whereas the players’ roles
remained unchanged in the …xed treatment.
For each couple, player 1 decided on her “payment” T1 to player 2. After that, player
2 was informed about T1 and he had to decide on the “delivery” T2 to player 1. Earnings
of player i in each round (Pi) were denoted in points and calculated according to equation
(1). Subjects could also use a table included in the instructions (see Appendix), which
gave Pi as a function of Ti and Tj. Subjects knew that a total of 15 rounds would be
played and that after the last round the points earned in all rounds would be accumulated
and transferred into money earnings at a …xed known rate.
After 15 rounds, an anonymous questionnaire asked for some background information
(gender, age, major, and motivation). After that, subjects were privately paid their
earnings in cash and left. In addition to the earnings from the experiment, which were
calculated by multiplying the total number of points earned by 5 cents, the participants
received 5 Dutch Guilders for showing up in time.5
In the Strangers treatments, all eight players interact, which gives, strictly speaking,
only one independent observation per session. In the Partners treatment, the players
interact in …xed pairs, and thus each session generates four independent observations.
4We have not found any signi…cant di¤erence in behavior between business or economics students
and other students.
5At the time of the experiment, one Dutch Guilder was about $0.50. Expected earnings, based on
previous experience of the experimenters, were somewhat higher than what students could earn with
one hour of work in, for instance, a bar.
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Table 1 displays the features of each treatment combination, their abbreviations, and the
number of sessions, subjects, plays and independent observations.
Table 1: Overview of the experimental treatments
treatment matching role total # total # total # # independent
abbreviation structure assignment sessions subjects plays observations
P-ch Partners changing 3 24 180 12
P-…x Partners …xed 3 24 180 12
S-ch Strangers changing 5 40 300 5
S-…x Strangers …xed 5 40 300 5
3 Experimental results
3.1 Introduction
Before presenting the main results we will …rst brie‡y discuss some predictions for our
game. Obviously, as the game under consideration is of a sequential nature, in each
treatment it is a dominant strategy for player 2 to give nothing, i.e. T2 = 0, if we assume
sel…sh, money-maximizing subjects. For player 1, on the other hand, it is not a dominant
strategy to give nothing because she has to anticipate player 2’s reaction to T1. However,
a backward induction argument leads to the unique equilibrium outcome of T1 = T2 = 0.
This subgame perfect Nash equilibrium yields a payo¤ of 9 to both players. It is clear
that players forego considerable gains from exchange by playing non-cooperatively. For
instance, a level of exchange of 2 would result in a payo¤ of 21 for both players. When
both players choose 4, the optimal symmetric payo¤ of 25 is achieved.
Previous experiments with the same game and experimental studies with related
games suggest that players often succeed in obtaining higher payo¤s than predicted by the
Nash equilibrium (Van der Heijden et al. (2000), Fehr and Gächter (2000)). Furthermore,
if one assumes that players are not only motivated by pecuniary considerations, but for
instance also by altruism, reciprocity or distributional concerns, other outcomes than the
Nash equilibrium of T1 = T2 = 0 might be expected. For example, if we apply Fehr and
Schmidt’s model on inequity aversion6 to our game, it turns out that, depending on the
parameter values of inequity aversion, the predictions contain all symmetric outcomes,
6Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume in their model that there are purely sel…sh individuals and indi-
viduals who dislike inequitable outcomes. Individuals of this latter type experience not only a loss in
utility if they are worse o¤ (in material terms) than the other subjects but also if they are better o¤
(but then the loss is smaller).
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i.e. T1 = T2 = k, if the …rst mover has perfect information on the type of the second
player. If the …rst mover has some a priori information on the probability of meeting an
inequity-averse (or reciprocal) opponent, she might earn more than implied by the Nash-
outcome by o¤ering a non-zero transfer every round, if this probability is su¢ciently
large.7
Hence, on the basis of previous experimental results as well as theoretical work, we
may expect to see some degree of cooperation in our game. The relevant and interesting
question then is whether we should expect to see di¤erences among the experimental
treatments under consideration. In this paper we focus on the impact of role assignment,
i.e. we are interested in the question whether exchanges and payo¤s are enhanced when
players have the same position all the time or when they change positions. Secondly, we
want to see whether this e¤ect di¤ers between Partners and Strangers.8 As argued earlier,
if we assume that all subjects are sel…sh, money-maximizing players the prediction is the
same for all treatments, i.e. no exchange. This prediction may change if players are
motivated by other concerns.
In the Partners treatment, subjects are matched with the same subject for all rounds.
This makes it easier to know the payo¤s of the partner, such that subjects who are
concerned about inequity may try to avoid an unequal distribution of the payo¤s. The
e¤ects of …xed or changing positions can point in di¤erent directions. On the one hand,
with …xed positions coordination of strategies may be somewhat less di¢cult, which
is likely to make cooperation easier. On the other hand, with …xed positions the …rst
player will not be able to directly “punish” a non-cooperative second player, although
she will …nd out pretty soon what type her second-moving partner looks like, or is trying
to mimic. One might therefore expect that in this case non-cooperative actions by the
second player will induce the …rst player to have recourse to stopping all transactions.
With changing positions, however, a …rst mover is less vulnerable to exploitation as she
can …nd compensation for her loss later on when she happens to be in the second-moving
position. As a result, …rst players can allow themselves to be more “tolerant” towards
uncooperative acts of her partner. Fixed positions will thus more likely be characterized
by less exploitation and more Nash-exchanges than changing positions.
Subjects in the Strangers treatment are matched with a di¤erent person in each round.
As noted above, if in the …xed treatment at least some second players can be expected to
act cooperatively, it can be bene…cial for …rst players to give positive transfers. A …rst
7To see this, suppose that …rst movers perceive a probability p of meeting an inequity averse individual
who will reciprocate a received transfer by a transfer of the same size. Even if …rst movers are sel…sh
and only care about their own expected payo¤ (so that they will maximize E(P1) = p(9 ¡T1)(1 +T1) +
(1 ¡ p)(9 ¡ T1) they set a non-zero T1 as soon as p > 19 .
8We do not compare the results of Partners and Strangers in this paper. For this comparison we refer
to Van der Heijden et al. (2000).
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player in both the …xed and the changing treatment then runs the risk of being exploited
by a zero return gift of the second player. But, again, a …rst player in the changing
treatment can take more risk and is more likely to o¤er higher transfers in order to incite
higher return transfers than a …rst player in the …xed treatment. This leads one to expect
higher transfers by …rst players in the changing treatment. On the other hand, inequity
averse second players in the …xed treatment will know that …rst players cannot make up
for losses in later rounds. As a result, they will sooner reciprocate …rst players’ gifts than
if they were in a changing treatment. Previous experiments with the exchange game have
indeed shown that under changing positions there is a considerable degree of exploitation
by second players, i.e. T2 < T1 (see Lensberg and Van der Heijden (1998)). Assuming
that in both the …xed and the changing treatment a certain percentage of the subjects
will endorse non-cooperative behavior, the above reasoning suggests that the (absolute)
di¤erence between T1 and T2 will be smaller under …xed positions than under changing
positions. Note, however, that this smaller di¤erence can be due to higher transfers by
…rst players in the changing treatment, or to larger transfers by second players in the
…xed treatment.
In the next section we will see to what extent these predictions prove to be correct.
3.2 Results
Table 2 gives the average transfer (T ) and the average payo¤ (P ) by player position for
each treatment, averaged across all sessions and all rounds.
Table 2: Average transfers and payo¤s by player and treatment
treatment T1 T2 P1 P2
P-ch 2.99 2.41 21.59 27.42
P-…x 2.40 2.12 19.49 22.33
S-ch 2.10 0.72 11.85 25.65
S-…x 2.14 0.99 13.06 24.59
From this table, the …rst observation can be derived:
Observation 1 : On average, there is no signi…cant di¤erence in the average payo¤s
between the treatments with …xed and changing roles for both players 1 and 2.
Observation 1 can be tested statistically by applying a non-parametric Mann-Whitney
U test to the payo¤s, with for Strangers session averages as units of observation (n1 =
n2 = 5), and for Partners couple averages as units of observation (n1 = n2 = 12). For
Partners these tests result in p = 0:98 for …rst players and p = 0:36 for second players.
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The same test for Strangers yields p = 0:47 for …rst players and p = 0:60 for second
players.
The …rst impression thus seems that role assignment has hardly any e¤ect, as there
is no distinction between the average payo¤s to players 1 and 2 with …xed or changing
positions. One should keep in mind, however, that while in the …xed treatments …rst
players remain in that position during the whole session, in the changing treatments
a player continuously changes position. A player will have the …rst- (second-)player
position on average half of the time in the latter treatments. This implies that the
individual payo¤s are determined by the average earnings in the position of both the …rst
and the second player. Obviously, this does not hold for the …xed treatments. Thus,
if a di¤erence in payo¤s between …rst and second players exists, this will largely a¤ect
players in the …xed treatments, but hardly in the changing treatments. A look at the
player positions indeed reveals that there are large di¤erences in this respect. That is:
Observation 2 : On average, players 1 earn less than players 2. This di¤erence is
signi…cant in all treatments, except for treatment P-ch.
Under Strangers the average payo¤ of second players is about twice as high as the
average payo¤s of …rst players (for both S-…x and S-ch a non-parametric Wilcoxon test
shows that this di¤erence is signi…cant at p = 0:04). In treatment S-ch this di¤erence
does not necessarily cause unequal payo¤s between players, but for treatment S-…x this
leads to a very uneven distribution of the payo¤s. Also for P-…x the average payo¤s to
…rst players are signi…cantly less than the average payo¤s to second players, while in P-ch
the di¤erence is considerable but not signi…cant (p = 0:07 and p = 0:20 for treatment
P-…x and P-ch, respectively).
[Insert Figure 1]
The above observations about the average payo¤s suggest that among Strangers the
payo¤s per individual are more unequally distributed in S-…x compared with S-ch. In
particular, …rst players in S-…x will have lower payo¤s than the second players in S-…x,
and, by implication, also lower payo¤s than the “average” player in S-ch. This inequality
also exists in the Partners treatment, given the obtained signi…cant di¤erence between the
payo¤s of players 1 and 2 in P-…x. More information about the distribution of the payo¤s
is depicted in Figure 1, which shows the Lorenz curve. In this …gure, the subjects have
been ranked according to (increasing) payo¤s. The horizontal axis shows the proportion
of the participants (ranked to their payo¤s) and the vertical axis the proportion of the
payo¤s earned by any given fraction of the subjects. In S-…x 50% of the players with the
lowest payo¤s earn in total just slightly more than 30% of the total earned payo¤. In
S-ch, the latter percentage is almost 41%. In the Partners treatments these percentages
are 38 (P-…x) and 43 (P-ch), respectively. This leads to:
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Observation 3 : The payo¤s are more equally distributed among individuals in the
changing treatments and the di¤erence with the …xed treatment is larger among
Strangers than among Partners.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from Figures 2a-2d, which depict histograms of
the average payo¤s per individual for each treatment separately. These …gures illustrate
that in the treatments with changing positions the average payo¤ per individual is more
concentrated and less dispersed in the payo¤ space than in the corresponding treatments
with …xed positions. This observation is supported by the standard deviations (and
the coe¢cients of variation) of the average payo¤ per individual, which amount to 4.76
(0.19) and 6.47 (0.31) for P-ch and P-…x, respectively, and 4.40 (0.23) and 7.24 (0.39) for
treatments S-ch and S-…x, respectively.
[Insert Figures 2a-2d]
Notice once again that in the treatments with changing roles the average payo¤s
can be interpreted as the payo¤ of any individual irrespective of her position. For the
treatment with …xed roles, however, the individual payo¤s depend on the position in the
exchange. To examine the consequences of this in more detail, Figures 3a-3d show the
distributions of the average individual payo¤ split by role assignment of …rst and second
players for treatments P-…x and S-…x.
[Insert Figures 3a-3d]
It is obvious that being the …rst player in S-…x is a very unfavorable position. For
instance, the average payo¤s of …rst players range from 9 to 19 whereas the lowest average
payo¤ for second players is 17, and the highest average payo¤ is as high as 38. For P-…x
an analogous conclusion can be drawn, although in that treatment the di¤erence is less
clear-cut: the distribution of payo¤s for the second player is somewhat more concentrated
between 25 and 35, while for the …rst player the average payo¤s is concentrated on values
between 11 and 28.
It will be clear that a …xed position in a transaction appears to hurt the …rst player,
who is exploited to some extent. In spite of this, we observe that exchanges do occur in
the …xed treatments. See Tables 3a-3d, which give the cross-tabulations of the decisions
of …rst and second players (T1 and T2) for each treatment separately.9If we de…ne the
situation in which 0 < T1 < 5 and T2 = 0 as being “no deliveries” and 0 < T1 < 5 and
0 < T2 < 5 as “reciprocal deliveries”10 we get:
9The average values of T1 and T2 are reported in Table 2. Mann-Whitney tests yield that none of
these averages are signi…cantly di¤erent between the …xed and the changing treatments.
10“Reciprocal deliveries” could also emerge as a result of inequity aversion. Here, we do not distinguish
between these two distinct motivating forces for reciprocity. For the sake of simplicity we just talk about
“reciprocal deliveries” instead of “reciprocal or inequity averse deliveries”.
10
Observation 4 : The frequency of “no deliveries” is lower and the frequency of “recip-
rocal deliveries” is higher in the …xed treatments compared to the changing treat-
ments.
Table 3a: Cross-table of the decisions of the player pairs in treatment S-ch
T2 = 0 0 < T2 < 5 T2 ¸ 5 total
T1 = 0 78 6 7 91
0 < T1 < 5 136 60 2 198
T1 ¸ 5 9 2 0 11
total 223 68 9 300
Table 3b: Cross-table of the decisions of the player pairs in treatment S-…x
T2 = 0 0 < T2 < 5 T2 ¸ 5 total
T1 = 0 63 11 2 76
0 < T1 < 5 96 107 3 206
T1 ¸ 5 13 3 2 18
total 172 121 7 300
Table 3c: Cross-table of the decisions of the player pairs in treatment P-ch
T2 = 0 0 < T2 < 5 T2 ¸ 5 total
T1 = 0 21 1 21 43
0 < T1 < 5 45 42 15 102
T1 ¸ 5 18 12 5 35
total 84 55 41 180
Table 3d: Cross-table of the decisions of the player pairs in treatment P-…x
T2 = 0 0 < T2 < 5 T2 ¸ 5 total
T1 = 0 49 7 12 68
0 < T1 < 5 16 54 9 79
T1 ¸ 5 11 20 2 33
total 76 81 23 180
The frequency of “no deliveries” amounts to 96 (or 32%) in S-…x against 136 (or
45%) in S-ch. “Reciprocal deliveries” occur in 107 (36%) against 60 (20%) of the cases,
respectively. Thus, the treatment with …xed positions lends itself more easily to a coop-
erative attitude and …rst players are less vulnerable to exploitation (“no deliveries”) by
the second player. Only the observed di¤erence in exploitation is statistically signi…cant
(p = 0:02, using a Mann-Whitney U test).
Among Partners the frequency of “no deliveries” equals 16 (9%) in P-…x versus 45
(25%) in P-ch whereas “reciprocal deliveries” take place in 54 (30%) and 42 (23%) of the
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cases, respectively. These distinctions are the same as those in the Strangers treatment.
The Nash-equilibrium of “no exchanges” (T1 = 0 and T2 = 0) shows a di¤erent picture
among Partners and Strangers, however. Among Strangers, “no exchanges” occur less
often in the …xed treatment compared to the changing treatment (63 against 78 cases, or
21% versus 26%) whereas they occur more often among Partners (49 against 21 cases, or
27% versus 12%). Also in the Partners treatment, only the di¤erence in “no deliveries”,
i.e. exploitation, is signi…cantly di¤erent between P-…x and P-ch (p = 0:01, using a
Mann-Whitney U test).11
For Partners these results conform to our expectations formulated in Section 3.1. We
claimed that if under P-…x the second player chooses not to deliver (i.e. 0 < T1 < 5 and
T2 = 0), the …rst player will sooner stop trying to complete a transaction and will rather
not go into any transaction at all. Support for this claim can be obtained from inspection
of the individual data. Among P-…x we observe 9 times “no deliveries”, followed by T1 = 0
in the next round, while in P-ch this can be observed 3 times. In 3 out of the 9 cases
of “no deliveries” in P-…x, one can interpret this as an endgame e¤ect. In one couple,
the …rst player tries to enforce transactions …ve times. If these attempts turn out to
be unsuccessful, she resorts to Nash behavior. In the other situations of “no deliveries”
we observe that afterwards the second player invests large amounts in order to rebuild
trust. The other couples in P-…x behave more or less in a reciprocal way. In half of these
“reciprocal” situations both players fully cooperate and their payo¤s are about equal,
whereas in the other half the second player slightly exploits the …rst one.
Among Strangers …rst players …rst need to have insight in the “average” behavior in
the group. As we noted in Section 3.1, if some players are expected to act reciprocally
(or to be characterized by inequity aversion) …rst players might be inclined to invest
during the whole game. In particular, …rst players will not quickly lose con…dence in
getting a return gift as the gain in case of a a return gift is relatively large. In S-…x
we observe only three times that the …rst player decides to quit going into transactions
after receiving “no deliveries” during a couple of rounds. Moreover, all but one …rst
players start with spending. We further observe cooperative behavior to a large extent in
this treatment. In three out of the …ve sessions the second player almost automatically
behaves reciprocally, albeit the second transfer generally is below the …rst transfer’s
level. But, what also matters is that the second player obviously expects the …rst player
to invest. If she does not, she is “punished” by T2 = 0. This punishment behavior is
nicely illustrated in one of the sessions. One of the …rst players consequently gives 0 and
11Another interesting observation from Tables 3a-3d is that several exchanges can be observed with
T1 ¸ 5 or T2 ¸ 5, in particular among Partners. Exchanges of the type (T1; T2) with T1 ¸ 5; T2 · 3 or
T1 · 3; T2 ¸ 5 can be called complex exchanges. They need a lot of coordination but they result in high
(total) payo¤s. It is beyond the scope of the present paper to explain this type of complicated behavior.
Van der Heijden et al. (2000) investigate the occurence and evolution of di¤erent types of exchanges.
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she almost always receives nothing. Conversely, the other 3 …rst players in that session
give a positive transfer and in general they receive a positive transfer. So, the payo¤
of these three (…rst-moving) players is considerably above that for the one Nash-playing
…rst player.
For the changing treatments we argued that …rst players can take more risk, even
though the likelihood of becoming exploited is sizable. Indeed, players seem to be con-
scious of the possibility of exploitation by the second player, but they are also conscious
of the opportunity changing roles o¤er to compensate losses incurred as a …rst player,
as we frequently observe what might be called “alternating no deliveries”. By this we
mean the process in which a subject, while being the second player, does not deliver (and
consequently exploits) and while being the …rst player does not receive “deliveries” in
spite of a positive transfer (and consequently is being exploited). In P-ch, 8 out of the
12 couples can be characterized by “alternating no deliveries”, 2 by (almost complete)
reciprocal behavior and 2 by (partial) one-sided exploitation. Except for the last two
couples, all couples realize a rather high payo¤, albeit full cooperative behavior would
result in even higher payo¤s. In S-ch we observe some 15 out of 40 subjects playing “al-
ternating no deliveries”. Here, indeed, …rst players are aware of the risk of exploitation
(as some 40% of them turn out to be exploiters when being second players themselves),
but they are nevertheless induced to give positive transfers in the role of …rst player.
Table 4 shows, for each treatment, the di¤erence between …rst and second transfers
T1 ¡ T2. It leads to:
Observation 5 : In the …xed treatments the di¤erence between …rst and second trans-
fers is smaller than in the changing treatments.
The entries in the table indicate whether the di¤erence is about equal (jT1 ¡ T2j · 1),
or unequal (T1 ¡ T2 ¸ 2 or T1 ¡ T2 · ¡2), only considering transfers below 5. If we
regard transfers that do not di¤er by more than one as (approximately) equal to each
other, then in S-…x 63.2% of the exchanges lead to equal transfers, while in S-ch this
holds in 50.7% of the cases. For Partners, this di¤erence is even more pronounced: in
P-…x 84.1% of the transfers are approximately equal while in P-ch this holds for 60.6%.
For both Partners and Strangers the average absolute di¤erence between T1 and T2 is
signi…cantly smaller in the …xed treatment than in the changing treatment (p = 0:03 in
both cases), i.e. transfers are more equal in the …xed treatment.
As noted earlier, Observation 5 might be explained by the more risky behavior of
the …rst player in the changing treatment. An alternative explanation is that in a …xed
treatment inequity averse second players will not permit large di¤erences with …rst players
to arise. The latter explanation …ts the data better than the …rst one: …rst players’ gifts
do not di¤er signi…cantly between the …xed and changing treatments (see fn. 9). As a
result, it follows that second players in the changing treatment are more engaged with
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making up their lossed incurred as …rst players in earlier rounds, while in the …xed
treatment second players reciprocate more.
Table 4: The distribution of the di¤erence T1 ¡ T2 by treatment
S-…x S-ch P-…x P-ch
T1 ¡ T2 ¸ 2 34.0 46.8 10.4 36.7
jT1 ¡ T2j · 1 63.2 50.7 84.1 60.6
T1 ¡ T2 · ¡2 2.9 2.6 5.6 2.7
In conclusion, we …nd that no deliveries in the changing treatments occur more fre-
quently and more intense than in the …xed treatments. In S-…x …rst players o¤er the
opportunity to become exploited by consistently giving positive transfers, but on average
this is bene…cial compared to having recourse to Nash-exchange. Moreover, we observe
some coherent reciprocal behavior among the groups in this treatment, also favoring …rst
players. In P-…x, however, …rst players can more easily …nd out what type of individual
their partner is (or mimics) and they will earlier stop trying to conclude a transaction if
they know their partners’ type. As a results, less exploitation occurs.
4 Summary and concluding discussion
In evaluating the e¤ects of …xed positions in bilateral exchanges positive and negative
elements can be observed. On the positive side, one consequence of having a …xed position
is that a player gets specialized in behavior. Returning to one of our real-world examples
from the introduction: a consumer in the US just knows that without a credit card in
her pocket she will never be able to conclude any transaction. Therefore, showing a
credit-card as a …rst move is known to be inextricably bound up with any exchange.
Specialization leads to cooperative behavior in a relatively large number of cases as has
been demonstrated by our experiments: in the treatments with …xed positions the number
of reciprocal exchanges is higher (but not signi…cantly higher) than in the treatments with
changing positions. Strikingly, among Partners …xed positions imply a larger percentage
of no exchanges as well. This can also be interpreted as the consequence of specialization
inherent to a …xed position. If roles are …xed, the …rst mover will be in a weaker position
than the second mover, as she (the …rst mover) can act, but not immediately react
whereas the second mover can respond. However, she can leave the initiative to the
second mover in letting him show whether he adheres to a cooperative attitude, or not.
The second mover has to “work harder” in a P-…x treatment to convince the …rst mover
of his willingness to increase her pay-o¤ compared to the Nash-equilibrium. If he fails to
convince her, the …rst player will quit trying to conclude transactions. This makes her
less vulnerable to exploitation by the second player. Indeed, one of our …ndings is that
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sel…sh reactions from second movers occur less often if the players are in a …xed position.
The “specialization” argument therefore contributes to explaining typical …ndings on
labor-market experiments where workers (second movers) show reciprocal behavior to a
non-negligible degree.
On the negative side, however, it is de…nitely the case that being in the …rst position
in all rounds gives a player an unfavorable position. This holds especially for exchanges
among Strangers. Due to exploitation …rst players in treatment S-…x earn considerably
less than second players (13.1 versus 24.6, see Table 2). With changing positions a player
is randomly assigned to the …rst or second position in each round, and the overall average
payo¤ is 18.8. So, being in a …xed …rst position among Strangers leads to lower average
payo¤s of 5.7 (=18.8-13.1). In P-…x …rst players also earn less than second players, but
here the di¤erence is less pronounced (19.5 versus 22.3). Yet, the loss in earnings due to
being in the …xed …rst position is almost the same as among Strangers (namely 5.0, which
follows from 24.5, the average earnings in treatment P-ch, minus 19.5). Among Partners,
moreover, the second mover will not lose if the …xed-role assignment were converted into
a changing-role assignment: his (average) payo¤ will then increase from 22.3 to 24.5.
These calculations suggest that a …xed position in exchange does not result in larger
total (or societal) welfare. Among Strangers the total welfare after exchange, measured
by the total payo¤ of both players together, is about equal in our experiments, irrespective
of the …xity of positions. Among Partners changing roles even renders larger welfare. As
we suggested above, under …xed roles the second mover has to “prove” being cooperative
before the …rst mover is willing to show a cooperative attitude as well. In a number of
cases the con…dence of the …rst mover in her partner was not induced, and she stuck
to giving no transfers at all. If positions are changing players start exchanging earlier
and keep on exchanging longer as non-cooperative behavior by a second mover can be
“punished” by the …rst mover later on while being in the position of the second mover.
Moreover, non-cooperative acts can be “tolerated” by the …rst mover as the second mover
might not have had the chance to learn to act cooperatively due to her being in di¤erent
positions every new round.
On balance, although most experimental studies on exchanges with a sequential char-
acter take …xed positions for granted12, our experiments suggest that …xed positions in
12One of the few exceptions is a paper by Forsythe, Lundholm and Reitz (1999). In their …nancial
market experiment, subjects can be assigned to di¤erent roles: sellers, who know true assets qualities,
or buyers, who only know the quality distribution of the assets. They …nd that sellers are willing to act
as cheaters, even if they have been cheated before in the postion of a buyer. This result is similar to our
…nding that second movers are willing to exploit …rst movers, even if they themselves have been exploited
before. In one of the experiments reported in Güth, Huck and Rapoport (1998), subjects switch roles
too. However, their results are hard to compare to ours as in their independent moves game each subject
had each role only once, and the order of play was not truly sequential. Instead, they applied a positional
order protocol, in which there was priority in time, but no priority in information.
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exchange do not generate unambiguous advantages compared to changing positions. In
real-world markets, …xed positions appear to be the rule as well. This raises the question
as to why in our experiments …xed positions do not show up as the dominant treatment.
For the answer to this question one must probably take account of the way changing or
…xed positions are actually determined. In our experiments with changing positions the
computer decided which party had to move …rst in each transaction. In the real world
one might not expect that some kind of lottery determines who gets the (favorable) sec-
ond position in each exchange if the positions are not …xed. Rather, the determination
of the position will most likely be part of some negotiation process. One determining
factor for the outcome here will be the market power of the two sides of the market.
If the supply side is the dominant force, it might enforce the most favorable role from
the weaker demand side. If the economic power of both sides of the market is more
level, negotiations on the role might entail transaction costs which are prohibitive for the
conclusion of transactions. In that case, one might conjecture that some evolutionary
process will wipe out many (if not all) transactions where a …xed-mover rule is absent.
The investigation of the development of transfers when individuals can bargain about
their position will be the subject of future research.
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Appendix
This appendix gives the English translation of the (Dutch) instructions of the experiment
for treatment S-ch. The text between brackets ({ }) was added when more than 8
participants showed up.
Introduction (read aloud only)
You are about to participate in an experimental study of decision-making. The experi-
ment will last for about one hour. The instructions of the experiment are simple and if
you follow them carefully and make good decisions you may earn a considerable amount
of money. All the money you earn will be yours to keep and will be paid to you, privately
and con…dentially, in cash right after the end of the experiment
{For the experiment it is of crucial importance to have 8 participants. However,
experience learns that often 1 or 2 persons do not show up or do not show up in time.
Therefore, we need to have 10 instead of 8 subscriptions. This sometimes has, as now,
the consequence that too many participants are present and that 1 or 2 persons cannot
participate in this experiment. These persons can still put their name down for one of
the following experiments and receive D‡ 10 for any inconvenience. These persons are
determined by lot because one or two blank envelopes are added to the box with seating
numbers, unless one of you checks in voluntarily not to participate in the experiment and
receive D‡ 10 instead.}
Before we go on with the instructions, I would like to ask all of you to draw an
envelope from this box and open it. The number denotes the terminal you have to be
seated. {If you draw a blank envelope you cannot participate in the experiment and you
receive D‡ 10.}
We will distribute the instructions of the experiment now and read through them
together. After that, you will have the opportunity to ask questions. From now on, you
are requested not to talk to, or communicate with, any other participant.
Instructions (distributed and read aloud)
Decisions and earnings
The experiment exists of …fteen separate rounds. In every round, each of you will earn
a certain amount of points. At the end of the experiment the points earned in the 15
rounds are added up for each participant separately. Every point earned is worth 5 cent
(¼$0.028) at the end of the experiment. In addition to this, all participants receive a
…xed extra amount of D‡ 5. Your total earnings will thus be equal to D‡ 5 plus the
number of points earned times 5 cent. Now, we describe how the points earned in each
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round will be determined.
In each round you will be matched with another participant. Each round will consist
of two periods. In every round you have in one period the role of Decider and in the other
period the role of Receiver. The earnings of a participant in a round are determined by
the …nal assets of a participant in the period in which he or she is a Decider, and by the
…nal assets of the participant in the period in which he or she is a Receiver. We denote
the …nal assets as Receiver by EO and the …nal assets as Decider by EB. The earnings
in points of a participant in a round are determined by the product of the …nal assets
as Receiver and the …nal assets as Decider. The earnings of a participant in a round are
thus equal to EB £ EO points. Next, we describe how the …nal assets as Decider EB
and the …nal assets as Receiver EO are determined.
In each round the participants are …rst randomly matched two by two. After that
the computer determines for each couple who will be the Decider in the …rst period and
who will be the Decider in the second period. In the second period the roles are reversed:
the Decider in the …rst period is thus the Receiver in the second period and the Receiver
in the …rst period is the Decider in of the second period. The Receiver starts with an
endowment of 1, whereas the Decider starts with and endowment of 9. The Decider has
to decide which part of his or her endowment he or she wants to transfer to the Receiver.
This transfer, which we will denote by T, is 0 at the minimum, and 7 at the maximum.
After the Decider has decided about the transfer T to the Receiver, the …nal assets of
the Receiver are EO=1+T, and those of the Decider are EB=9-T. After the Decider has
decided about her or his transfer to the Receiver, the second period of the round will be
started, in which the roles are reversed.
In the second period, the other participant of the couple, who is the Decider now,
will have to make a decision. The determination of the …nal assets of the new Receiver
and Decider in this period is similar to the previous period. The Receiver starts with an
endowment of 1 and the Decider starts with an endowment of 9. The Decider decides
again on the part of her or his endowment that will be transferred to the Receiver. This
transfer T determines the …nal assets of both participants in the second period: EO=1+T
for the Receiver and EB=9-T for the Decider.
As said, your earnings in a round are determined by the product of your …nal assets
EB in your role of Decider and the …nal assets EO in your role of Receiver. Your assets
EB are dependent on your transfer to the Receiver in the period you are Decider and
your assets EO are dependent on the transfer from the Decider to you in the period you
are Receiver. To facilitate the determination of your earnings, you may use the table
below.
The table states your earnings in points in a round dependent on the transfer from
you to the Receiver when you are Decider and the transfer to you by the Decider when
you are Receiver. In this table the rows present the transfer from you as Decider to
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the Receiver and the columns present the transfer to you as Receiver from the Decider.
When you …rst look for the transfer from you in the row and then go to the right to the
column stating the transfer to you, you can read your earnings in points, EB £ EO, for
the round. The earnings in money are determined by multiplying the stated amount in
points by 5 cents.
Transfer to you
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 9 18 27 36 45 54 63 72
1 8 16 24 32 40 48 56 64
2 7 14 21 28 35 42 49 56
Transfer 3 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48
from you 4 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
5 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32
6 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
7 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
When the two period in a round are over, so when both participants have decided on
a transfer, a new round will be started.
Procedure and usage of the computer
After we have gone through the instructions, …rst a practice round will be run. After the
practice round, the …fteen rounds that determine your earnings for this experiment will
be run.
In every round the computer, in a completely random manner, …rst determines who
will be matched to whom. Then the computer determines, again in a random manner,
for each couple who will get the role of Receiver and Decider in the …rst period. On the
upper left part of the screen the Decider will see the number of the current round and
the message ” You are now Decider in the …rst period”. Underneath the Decider will
seethe question ”How much of your endowment do you transfer (0-7)?” The Decider has
to type an integer from 0 up to and including 7. The number typed is the transfer T to
the Receiver with whom he has been matched in this round.
Next, the current Decider will be asked the question ”How much do you expect to
receive?”. Here, the Decider types an integer from 0 up to and including 7, dependent on
her or his expectation about the transfer she or he expects to receive as Receiver in the
next period. This expectation is used by us when analyzing the experiment, but your
earnings will be una¤ected by it. Besides, the other participants are not informed about
your expectations stated.
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After all Deciders have made a decision, the …rst period is over. In the second period
the Receivers of the …rst period are now the Deciders. Every new Decider will see on the
screen that in this round he or she is Decider in the second period and how much he or
she has received in the previous period. Underneath there is the question ”How much of
your endowment do you transfer (0-7)? The Decider has to type an integer from 0 up
to and including 7. The number typed is the transfer T to the Receiver with whom he
has been matched in this round. When all Deciders of the second period have made a
decision all participants will see how much they have received and what their earnings
for the rounds are. These earnings are in points and are equal to the product of the
…nal assets as Decider and the …nal assets as Receiver: EB £ EO. After one has been
informed about this, the round is over and a new round will be started.
In the new round, the computer again determines …rst who will be matched with
whom and next for each couple who will be the …rst Decider. So, you do not know with
whom you are matched in a particular round and whether you will be the …rst or the
second Decider.
Summary
The experiment consists of 15 rounds, and every round consists of 2 periods. In each
round the participants are randomly matched two by two by the computer. In each round
every participant has in one period the role of Decider and in the other period the role
of Receiver. When you are Decider your endowment is 9 and your …nal assets depend
on your transfer T to the Receiver: EB=9-T. When you are Receiver your endowment
is 1 and your …nal assets depend on the transfer T by the Decider to you: EO=1+T.
Your earnings in points in a round are determined by the product of your …nal assets as
Decider and your …nal assets as Receiver: EB £ EO. After the …rst period of a round
is over the new Deciders are informed about the transfer T which they have received in
the …rst period. After both periods in a round have been …nished, everybody is informed
about the transfer T to him or her and his or her earnings in that round.
The matching of the participants and the order in which participants are Decider
in the two periods of a round are determined by the computer in a completely random
way time after time. You will never be able to know whether you will be the …rst or
the second Decider in a particular round, or with whom you are matched in a particular
round.
Final remarks
After the last round, you will …rst be requested to answer some questions to evaluate the
experiment. This questionnaire is anonymous. We can link your answers to your seat
number but not to your name. After that, you will be called by your seat number to
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receive your earnings privately and con…dentially. Your earnings are your own business;
you do not need to discuss with anyone. It is not allowed to talk to or communicate with
other participants during the experiment in either way.
On your table you will …nd an empty sheet, which you can use to take notes. Addi-
tionally, you will …nd a sheet labeled ”REMARKS”. On this sheet you can make remarks
about the instructions or your decisions.
You get a couple of minutes to go through the instructions and to ask questions.
When you want to ask something, please raise your hand. One of us will come to your
table to speak to you.
After that we will start the practice round.
Are there any questions?
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Figure 1: Lorenz curve of the payo¤s per individual
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Figure 2a: Histogram of the average payo¤ per individual in P-ch
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Figure 2b: Histogram of the average payo¤ per individual in P-…x
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Figure 2c: Histogram of the average payo¤ per individual in S-ch
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Figure 2d: Histogram of the average payo¤ per individual in S-…x
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Figure 3a: Histogram of the average payo¤ per individual in P-…x. First players
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Figure 3b: Histogram of the average payo¤ per individual in P-…x. Second players
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Figure 3c: Histogram of the average payo¤ per individual in S-…x. First players
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Figure 3d: Histogram of the average payo¤ per individual in S-…x. Second players
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